Do Economic Models Have to be Realistic?: A Methodological Criticism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality by Makovi, Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Do Economic Models Have to be
Realistic?: A Methodological Criticism of
Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality
Michael Makovi
July 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65790/
MPRA Paper No. 65790, posted 28. July 2015 20:26 UTC
Do Economic Models Have to be Realistic?: A Methodological Criticism of Rousseau's 
Discourse on Inequality
Michael Makovi*
Abstract: In the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1754) sketches a hypothetical illegitimate social contract to explain the origin of socioeconomic 
inequality. Rousseau himself notes that his illegitimate social contract is not intended to be 
historically accurate. But this casts doubt on the methodological validity of his argument. 
According to Ronald Coase's (1981) criticism of Milton Friedman (1953) statements on the 
methodology of positive economics, theoretical models, to be valid, must possess a certain 
degree of realism which Rousseau's does not. This same criticism applies to Carole Pateman's 
adaptation of Rousseau in her Sexual Contract (1988).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is most famous for his work On the Social Contract 
(Du Contrat Social) (1762), where he expounds his theory of the General Will and its crucial role 
in the establishment of a social contract for legitimate government. However, Rousseau has 
another theory of the social contract as well, put forth in his “Second Discourse”, the Discourse 
on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de 
l'inégalité parmi les hommes) (1754). The two social contracts are very different and they play 
quite different roles in Rousseau's thought. Whereas the social contract of The Social Contract is 
meant to provide a normative basis for legitimate government, the social contract of the 
Discourse is just the opposite. The Discourse's social contract is illegitimate and is meant to 
explain not what government ought to be, but what it unfortunately has tended to be. This 
illegitimate social contract exists to fraudulently legitimize unjust socioeconomic inequality and 
to convince the weak to acquiesce in the domination exercised over them by the powerful. 
* Recent (spring 2015) BA graduate (economics) of Loyola University, New Orleans. This 
essay originated as a term paper for Prof. Jonathan Peterson's spring 2015 philosophy course, 
“Freedom, Rights, and the State of Nature”. The author thanks Prof. Peterson for commenting 
on the original draft, but all errors remain the author's.
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Rousseau uses social contract theory to explore the nature and existence of socioeconomic 
inequality so that the injustice may be ultimately rectified.
Surprisingly, however, the illegitimate social contract of the Discourse has been virtually 
ignored in academic discussion (Mills 2007: 82). Even Carole Pateman, whose Sexual Contract 
(1988) appears to build on Rousseau, does not mention Rousseau's Discourse (Mills 2007: 81). 
We argue that Rousseau's argument in the Discourse is methodologically flawed and that 
Rousseau's argument, as it stands, is not a tenable criticism of inequality. In other words, we 
argue not merely that Rousseau is incorrect or that we disagree with his conclusions, but more 
fundamentally, that his very mode of argumentation is flawed, based as it is on an ahistorical 
counterfactual. For by Rousseau's own admission, the illegitimate social contract is hypothetical 
and ahistorical. This criticism applies not only to Rousseau but also to those who have adapted 
Rousseau's methodology, in particular Carole Pateman's “conjectural history” (Mills 1997: 6) in 
her Sexual Contract (Pateman 1988).1 However, Rousseau's and Pateman's works are not beyond 
saving. Their conclusions may be defended as long as their methodological basis for 
argumentation is suitably modified.
This essay is divided into two sections: the first (I) summarizes the illegitimate social 
contract as it is set forth in the Discourse (Rousseau 1754). The second (II) presents the 
methodological criticism of Rousseau's argument. The methodological criticism of Rousseau is 
based on Ronald Coase's (1981) reply to Milton Friedman's (1953) famous statements on 
economic methodology. An appendix briefly summarizes Rousseau's more well-known 
legitimate social contract in The Social Contract, where Rousseau (1762) expounds the theory of 
the “General Will” (volonte generale). This appendix is included for readers who wish to 
understand how why Rousseau has not one but two theories of the social contract. 
I. The Illegitimate Social Contract Summarized
1 This criticism will not apply, however, to the Racial Contract by Charles Mills (1997). Although Mills 
claims to follow Rousseau's Discourse (Mills 1997: 5), he differs from Rousseau and Pateman in that 
his (Mills's) is meant to be historically descriptive (Mills 1997: 5, 20) in a way that Rousseau's and 
Pateman's are not (Mills 1997: 6, 19).
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In the Discourse, Rousseau (1754) uses social contract theory to explain the origin of 
human inequality. According to Rousseau (1754: 379f.), previous examinations of the state of 
nature had failed because they had presumed human nature to be constant; they had essentially 
taken civilized man and transplanted him into the state of nature. Instead, Rousseau says, one 
must examine man “as nature had formed him” (1754: 376). Although the state of nature never 
actually existed in history (Rousseau 1754: 377, 380), the concept is useful as a thought-
experiment to discover what is innate in human nature and what is artificially contributed by 
society and social interaction (Rousseau 1754: 376, 380). 
According to Rousseau, there are two natural human instincts: self-preservation and 
repugnance at observing suffering (Rousseau 1754: 378, 390-392). But sociability is not natural 
(Rousseau 1754: 378). Other alleged traits of human nature, such as desire and pride, are really 
artificial products of social life, not intrinsic to human nature (Rousseau 1754: 380, 398). Natural 
man would have been non-social, like other animals (1754: 381, 386, 389, 395), with concerns 
going only as far as his physical needs (1754: 385). To such a natural person, concepts such as 
good and evil, virtue and vice are not relevant (Rousseau 1754: 390). Furthermore, being an 
asocial creature, such a natural person would have no concept of “mine and thine” nor would 
they ever take offense or feel personal affront; physical injuries by others would never cause the 
victim to feel a diminution to personal honor (Rousseau 1754: 392, 424).
But all of this changed with the development of society. First, man developed tools to 
overcome physical challenges (Rousseau 1754: 395f.). With this, man began to realize his 
superiority over the other animals, giving rise to the first stirrings of pride and individuality 
(Rousseau 1754: 396). But there was still no language (Rousseau 1754: 396). Then came the 
nuclear family (Rousseau 1754: 397), and as new social bonds and relationships proliferated, 
people began to value esteem and reputation (Rousseau 1754: 398). The moral outrage and 
affront at an injury came to exceed the injury itself, and people began to take revenge for 
perceived slights (Rousseau 1754: 398, 424). Revenge and the new institution of property 
created the need for punishment and justice (Rousseau 1754: 398, 400). And with all these came 
new vices: ostentation, cunning, jealousy, rivalry, and above all, the desire to profit at another's 
expense (Rousseau 1754: 400-401). In short, social interaction and the transition from a hunter-
gatherer society to settled agriculture created new desires and psychologies which had never 
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existed before, including vanity, greed, ambition, materialism, and covetousness. In contrast to 
the natural sense of self-preservation (amour de soi), egocentrism (amour propre) is artificial, 
and socially-originated, causing one to desire things one lacks, be dissatisfied with what one has, 
miserable with envy, oppressively reliant on the opinions of others, desirous to dominate others, 
and alienated from true value (cf. Rousseau 1754: 424). Furthermore, with the rise of private 
property and the division of labor, unnatural moral inequality arose – some amassed more 
property than others – but this had no counterpart or basis in natural physical inequality among 
people (Rousseau 1754: 399-400).
It is at this point that the illegitimate social contract arises. With vice arises a state of war, 
and the rich in particular know that they maintain their possessions only through force, but that 
the tables could turn at any time (Rousseau 1754: 401). Alarmed by the precariousness of their 
own tenure, the rich and powerful concoct the social contract, inventing “specious reasons” to 
justify it: they claim that government is necessary to protect everyone equally and justly 
(Rousseau 1754: 402). But in reality, this enshrines their inequality and converts usurpation into 
right (Rousseau 1754: 402). The social contract, under the guise of promoting justice, only 
institutionalizes injustice. “Rousseaus's contract is therefore a bogus contract, contract as scam” 
(Mills 2007: 82). This is similar to the Marxist notion that the modern state's liberalism and due 
process of rule-of-law, are merely an ideological superstructure concealing the truth – that the 
state is the executor of the bourgeois's own private class interests. Rousseau anticipated Marx in 
arguing that the state's claim of equity merely masks reality, for the state exists to protect the 
unequal rule of the elite and powerful (Mills 2007: 82).
II. Methodological Criticism of the Illegitimate Social Contract of the Discourse
As interesting as Rousseau's account is, it is not clear whether it is suitable for explaining 
the basis of contemporary inequality. As Rousseau himself notes, his entire account is a 
hypothetical thought-experiment and not an attempt to understand actual history (Rousseau 
1754: 376f., 380). Therefore, it would be difficult to use his account to diagnose any specific 
injustices or prescribe appropriate correctives. For example, a proposal for reparations to African 
Americans should be based on a historical analysis of slavery, not hypothesis.
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Furthermore, the use of tools, which Rousseau connects to the departure from the state of 
nature, predates the human species itself. So it is doubtful whether Rousseau's concept of natural 
man is enlightening at all as a means of understanding ourselves. Rousseau considers natural 
man to be asocial and society as a foreign addition which changes his nature. It would seem more 
correct to reverse this order, to consider society to be natural and isolation unnatural. Man would 
certainly display totally different characteristics within and outside society, but we should 
consider the asocial existence to be perverted and unnatural. The nature of the isolated man 
seems to be closer to a sort of mental illness unworthy of being upheld as a normative example.
But this only scratches the surface of what might be said against Rousseau's account. A 
more fundamental criticism requires us to inquire into the methodology of social contract theory. 
Only by deeply probing social contract theory as a whole, may we ascertain which arguments are 
sound. Robert Nozick (1974: 3-9) offers one approach. According to him (1974: 9), 
We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it didn't arise 
that way. If it didn't arise that way, we also would learn much by determining why 
it didn't: by trying to explain why the particular bit of the real world that diverges 
from the state-of-nature model is as it is.
Furthermore, he says (1974: 8), “Fact-defective fundamental potential explanations, if their false 
initial conditions 'could have been true,' will carry great illumination.” In other words, it is useful 
to pose a counterfactual if it is possible for it to have been or to become factual. At the same 
time, Nozick says (1974: 8 note), “It will not increase our understanding of a realm to be told as 
a potential explanation what we know to be false: that by doing a certain dance, ghosts or 
witches or goblins made the realm that way.” A counterfactual based on such supernatural forces 
can not possibly have been or become factual, so it fails to help us understand reality. 
Thus, whether a counterfactual hypothetical is useful, says Nozick, depends on whether it 
could have easily been otherwise – whether the counterfactual could have been factual. But if the 
counterfactual is so absurd or unrealistic that it never could have resembled reality, then it tells 
us nothing useful. Nozick's standard provides us a helpful way of assessing Rousseau's 
hypothetical illegitimate social contract: the question is whether reality could have proceeded as 
laid out in Rousseau's Discourse (1754). If Nozick is right, then insofar as the events of 
Rousseau's Discourse differ from actual history, Rousseau's Discourse is useful only as a foil 
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against which to compare history, but it cannot explain the origin of inequality.
But as helpful as Nozick's remarks are, they are incomplete, for there is in fact another 
way in which social contract theory may be used: as a normative thought-experiment. This is 
how Rawls (1971) uses social contract theory in A Theory of Justice (Mills 1997: 4f., 10; Mills 
2007: 94). According to Rawls, we may conceive of the nature of legitimate government by 
imagining what sort of contract people would agree to from behind the veil of ignorance. 
Obviously Rawls does not think that anyone ever actually sat or could sit behind a literal veil of 
ignorance and came to any such agreement. But Rawls thinks that this exercise is useful as a 
thought-experiment so that we may determine what sort of social contract we would agree to if 
we could sit behind such a veil. As a normative thought-experiment, such a social contract 
provides a basis for our future conduct regardless of how well it explains our past behavior. 
Whether any government in the past was formed on a Rawlsian basis is irrelevant, and it is 
beside the point whether such a social contract was ever agreed to or could have been agreed to. 
All that matters for Rawls is that government policy in the future be based on his model. “[T]he 
hypothetical agreement is meant to model, and provide the basis for, actual agreement” 
(D'Agostino, Gaus, and Thrasher 2014).  Similarly, Locke's social contract has value even if it is 
hypothetical and ahistorical, because his social contract is ultimately normative: if this was not 
how the state actually arose, then it is how it should have arisen, and we ought to reform the state 
to resemble what it is supposed to be. The Lockean and Rawlsian social contracts, if conceived 
of as normative thought-experiments, help us specify the legitimate role of government, and they 
provide us a basis for reform insofar as actual government departs from this theoretical ideal. A 
hypothetical thought-experiment is therefore a useful way to compare reality as it is to how it 
ought to be. We can imagine what sort of government policies would be suggested by a Rawlsian 
or Lockean social contract. Then we can reform our present system insofar as it departs from 
what the thought-experiment's conclusions dictate.
But the illegitimate social contract of Rousseau's Discourse (1754) is not offered as a 
normative ideal, but just the opposite. But then it is not clear how we benefit from a thought-
experiment about something that neither happened nor ought to have happened. Although both 
Charles Mills and Carole Pateman adapt Rousseau's illegitimate social contract, Mills uses it to 
produce a historical theory of racial relations (Mills 1997: 5, 20) whereas Carole Pateman's 
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“conjectural history” is not meant to be historical (Mills 1997: 6, 19). Rousseau's and Pateman's 
illegitimate social contracts neither criticize actual historical institutions, nor do they provide a 
normative guideline or benchmark for reforming present-day institutions. It is not clear, then, 
what useful function or purpose the illegitimate hypothetical social contract can serve. At best, 
Rousseau and Pateman offer us ahistorical counterfactuals against which we can compare history 
– we can understand what happened by comparing it to what did not happen (cf. Nozick 1974: 
8f.). According to Nozick, the value of a counterfactual is that when we say, “if A, then B”, and 
we witness not-B, then we know not-A. But this is not what Rousseau and Pateman intended 
their illegitimate social contracts to do. They thought their illegitimate social contracts somehow 
helped us understand our present inequality directly, not merely by giving us something against 
which to compare. In other words: Rousseau and Pateman tell us that, “if society evolved in this 
way, we should expect inequality.” According to Nozick, this is valuable because we can 
conclude, “if we fail to find inequality, it means that society did not evolve that way.” But 
Rousseau and Pateman expect more out of their theories than this. 
An analogy to economic methodology may help illuminate why historical accuracy is 
necessary to judge inequality. Milton Friedman famously argued, in his “Methodology of 
Positive Economics” (1953) that the correctness or usefulness of an abstract economic model has 
nothing to do with the realism of its assumptions. Instead, Friedman argued, all that matters for a 
model is whether it needs empirically testable predictions. A model may rely on absurdly 
unrealistic assumptions, Friedman said, as long as its predictions are borne out. For example, 
Friedman said (1953: 19f.), it would be legitimate to posit that the leaves of a tree deliberately 
and consciously seek out sunlight, based on a cognitively correct understanding of the laws of 
physics. “Despite the apparent falsity of the 'assumptions' of the hypothesis, it has great 
plausibility because of the conformity of its implications with observation” (Friedman 1953: 20). 
Empirically, leaves do bend and point towards sunlight, so the theory is legitimate because it 
makes the correct prediction, even though it falsely assumes that tree leaves are sentient and 
calculating.
According to Ronald Coase, however, it is not enough that a theory yield correct 
predictions, for even more than we desire empirically correct predictions, we want 
understanding. We do not want to merely know what will occur, but why it will occur. If we hope 
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to understand not merely that leaves grow towards the sun but why, then assuming leaves are 
sentient will not do. As Coase notes (1988: 65), we could have correctly predicted American 
energy policy in the 1980s by assuming that the American government was deliberately lowering 
the American standard-of-living in order to enrich the power and incomes of the OPEC 
countries. But such an assumption is obviously absurd even though it yields correct predictions. 
Although the American government harmed Americans and benefited foreigners, this was 
presumably not its intent. If we wish to understand American energy policy, we should instead 
strive to understand why the American government pursued those damaging policies. It is not 
enough to correctly predict the outcome; we want to understand why that outcome will occur. 
Coase concludes (1988: 65),
Testable predictions are not all that matters. And realism in our assumptions is 
needed if our theories are ever to help us understand why the system works in the 
way it does. Realism in assumptions forces us to analyze the world that exists, not 
some imaginary world that does not.
Milton Friedman defends his argument by noting (1953: 16-19) that physicists routinely 
incorporate unrealistic counterfactual assumptions into their models, such as assuming a vacuum 
or a frictionless surface. But Friedman fails to appreciate two things: first, that the physicist takes 
careful note to remember which facts of reality have been removed from their model, so that they 
may be added back in later. For example, it may be useful to temporarily assume a vacuum when 
modeling ballistics, in order to focus on the effect of gravity. But when it comes to building an 
actual rocket or weapons targeting system, one can be sure that air resistance will be added back 
into the model. Second, that counterfactual assumptions are made only concerning those aspects 
of reality which are not central to the principle subject of study, in order to simplify the study. 
For example, when studying the effects of the minimum wage, we may simplify matters by 
ignoring the effects of capital gains taxes (Coase 1988: 66). But we never make simplifying 
assumptions about the actual phenomenon being studied. For example, it would not help us study 
the effect of gravity on a projectile if we were to assume that gravity behaves differently than it 
actually does.
Therefore, it is not sufficient that Rousseau's illegitimate social contract in the Discourse 
(1754) correctly predicts socioeconomic inequality. Instead, what we want is a theory that makes 
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the correct prediction for the correct reason. For we could just as easily predict historical 
inequality if we assume that Martians came to earth in antiquity and imposed inequality against 
our wills. But such an assumption does not help us understand the world as it actually is. If we 
are to correct inequality, then we require a theory which helps us understand why inequality 
actually exists. Only by understanding the true cause – not a hypothetical, counterfactual cause – 
can we correct the problem.
Hence, what really strike against Rousseau's theory are not the individual historical 
inaccuracies, such as his statements that early mankind was asocial. Instead, what is truly 
problematic about his theory is his express statement that it is not meant to be even remotely 
historical at all. The ahistorical nature of the illegitimate social contract makes it doubtful, on 
methodological grounds, that the argument has any validity or usefulness. An ahistorical 
legitimate social contract is useful for providing a normative benchmark against which to 
compare reality and by which to propose salutatory reforms. Or an ahistorical counterfactual can 
help us understand logical associations; positing “if A, then B” reveals that “if not-B, then not-
A.” But an ahistorical illegitimate social contract neither helps us understand what ought to be in 
the future, nor does it help us criticize what has been in the past, nor does it assist in studying 
logical associations. In order to criticize historical injustices, we must understand just what those 
injustices actually were, not what they hypothetically could have been but weren't. 
Hypothetically, we can imagine that African Americans tricked 19th-century Chinese railroad 
workers into prostitution. This social contract has as much historical truth as Rousseau's, but 
what does it prove? Literally nothing. An illegitimate hypothetical about the past neither helps us 
understand the past nor correct the future. In other words, it is not that we disagree with 
Rousseau's condemnation of inequality. Our criticism runs much deeper: we argue that his mode 
of argumentation is fundamentally untenable and scientifically useless. Even if his conclusions 
are correct, they are arrived at through illegitimate means, as if someone solved a math problem 
by rolling dice. And unless we are content to rely on luck, it is more important that our methods 
are correct than our conclusions.2
2 Imagine a mathematics teacher gives an examination to two students. One student goes through the 
proper procedures but makes a few minor mistakes, such as accidentally dropping a negative sign. In 
the end, he or she gets the wrong answer, but he or she still followed the proper procedures. 
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But there may be one way to defend Rousseau and those who follow his methodology, 
including Pateman. One could argue that although the hypothetical illegitimate social contract is 
ahistorical, it still approximates actual history where it is crucial. In other words, one would 
argue that the hypothetical is not a complete fabrication, but that it is merely a simplification of 
actual history which aims to capture those salient aspects while abstracting away from 
complicating details (cf. Coase 1988: 66). In this way, the hypothetical illegitimate social 
contract would be similar to a physics model which assumes a vacuum while studying the effects 
of gravity (cf. Friedman 1953: 16-19). It may be that these hypothetical illegitimate social 
contracts are illustrative simplifications of actual history which expose the crucial facts common 
to most if not all human societies by abstracting away from those particular details which vary 
among societies. But such a defense has yet to be made.
Appendix: The Legitimate Social Contract and the General Will in Rousseau's Social Contract 
(1762)
Rousseau's illegitimate social contract in the Discourse (1754) should be distinguished 
from the legitimate social contract of the Social Contract (1762). In the latter, more famous 
work, Rousseau argues that the government should execute the “General Will” (volonte 
generale) of people because it is the will of the people. 
Rousseau's emphasis on the will of the people is quite novel. For as much as Locke 
(1689) and Hobbes (1651) disagree on the private right of revolution against unjust government, 
they both agree – in their respective social contract theories – that the fundamental purpose of the 
state is to protect private property, not to execute the will of the people as such. Locke and 
Hobbes both argue that in the state of nature, there will be insufficient protection of private 
property, and therefore, civil government should be established. They disagree, however, on just 
how chaotic and vicious life in the state of nature would be, with Hobbes arguing it would be 
“nasty, brutish, and short”, but with Locke painting a more optimistic portrait. For this reason, 
Locke and Hobbes disagree on the desirability and permissibility of a return to the state of nature 
Meanwhile, the second student scribbles a lot of nonsense but manages, by sheer improbable luck, to 
get the correct answer. To which student will the mathematics teacher award the better grade?
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when government abuses its trust and exceeds its legitimate activities. For Hobbes, the state of 
nature is so awful that even the worst government is preferable to it, whereas Locke is more 
optimistic about life in the state of nature. But Locke and Hobbes agree that the state has a very 
narrowly circumscribed function, to protect private property alone, and that state is best which 
fulfills that function optimally. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by contrast, in the Social Contract 
(1762), thinks the purpose of government is to execute the will of the people as such.
Now, Rousseau does not mean that the government should simply do whatever the 
majority votes for. He specifies the caveat that sometimes the “will of all” – produced by 
majoritarian voting – is not the same as the “General Will”. For the “will of all” to be the same as 
the “General Will”, a few conditions must be satisfied: there be direct democracy (not 
representative); there must be universal suffrage; and people must vote for what is good for 
society as a whole, not for themselves as individuals. In other words, people should vote with the 
public interest in mind, not as a private interests or factions. Only then will the “will of all” be 
the same as the “General Will”. Nevertheless, it is clear that for Rousseau, the majority opinion 
or popular will has a value which is foreign to Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau believes that the 
government should do whatever the General Will dictates, simply because it is what the people 
have willed. The government should give the people what they want merely because they want it, 
and Rousseau does not conceive of any constitutional restrictions on the government's powers. 
Rousseau seems to envision something like a direct deliberative democracy without 
constitutional limits, where people debate over what is good and come to a consensus. Once a 
consensus is reached, the government should enforce that consensus, whatever it happens to be. 
There are no absolute constitutional restrictions on the government's legitimate field of activity. 
Rousseau's social contract therefore resembles contemporary political science's model of illiberal 
(unlimited) direct deliberative democracy.3 By contrast, Hobbes and Locke would say that the 
3 On deliberative democracy, see Hague and Harrop 2007: 46-49. According to that theory,
we should view democracy as a method of communication. ... In an open debate 
arguments based on private interests are soon recognized and discounted; public 
reason involves appeal to the public good. ... In such conditions, a consensus should 
emerge about what is truly in the public interest, with reason triumphing over 
interests. (Hague and Harrop 2007: 46f.)
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government's legitimate business is only the protection of property rights, and that the 
government cannot legitimately act outside this sphere. While Hobbes would deny the people the 
right to revolt when the government oversteps its boundaries, nevertheless, Hobbes agrees with 
Locke that that government is best which most securely protects people's rights, especially 
property rights. That may sometimes imply democracy, but not necessarily. For Hobbes and 
Locke, democracy is at best an efficient means for helping ensure the government remains 
limited to protecting property rights, but democracy has no independent value of its own. By 
contrast, Rousseau prefers democracy not because it is necessarily better at accomplishing some 
given, specific task or function, but simply because democracy is democracy. For Rousseau, 
democracy is a constitutive end; for Locke and Hobbes, democracy is at best an efficient means.
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